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Transnational challenges have added a level of complexity to international and national security as the 
geopolitical landscape adjusts and responds. Such challenges transcend individual borders to involve 
other nation-states regardless of whether they are willing or unwilling actors. One such transnational 
challenge is energy security and the resilience of the energy supply system. While energy is generally 
considered as a national issue associated with meeting the internal needs of a civil society, it is also 
part of a wider dynamic global system that is vulnerable to a number of factors and is a major 
influence in framing foreign policy stances. This paper addresses the linkage between energy security 
and foreign policy at both the state and international levels. It does this by examining some of the 
issues and challenges associated with energy as a transnational security issue and the ways it affects 
relations between nation-states. The focus of this paper is on petroleum-based fuel and gas, and on 
the security and resilience of the energy supply system. Given the ongoing dependence on these 
traditional forms of energy, it is argued that these energy systems need to be resilient so that, in turn, 
civil society is resilient and human security is enhanced. The paper explores some of the issues for the 
European Union (EU) including the resilience of its associated energy systems. The paper also 
considers issues that enhance or inhibit the resilience of the energy system with particular reference to 
the EU. 
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Introduction 
“For more than a century, energy, politics, and power have been clearly intertwined 
as a force in international security”1. Indeed the decision before WWI by then First 
Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill to convert the British Royal Navy from coal 
to oil is an overt example of linking energy and security. In doing so, Churchill 
recognised there were risks, and vulnerabilities, associated with such a decision. In 
Churchill’s memoirs2 he wrote: 
 
oil supplies of the world were in the hands of vast oil trusts under foreign 
control. To commit the navy irrevocably to oil was indeed to take arms against 
a sea of troubles. ... If we overcame the difficulties and surmounted the risks, 
we should be able to raise the whole power and efficiency of the navy to a 
                                                
1C. Pascual, E. Zambetakis, (2008), The Geopolitics of Energy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC,  
p.33. 
2W. S. Churchill, (1923), The World Crisis, Scribner Books, New York, Vol 1, pp. 133-136. 
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definitely higher level; better ships, better crews, higher economies, more 
intense forms of war power – in a word, mastery itself was the prize of the 
venture. 
 
Such a decision inexorably linked energy policy with national security within the 
wider geopolitical system. Other navies followed with similar conversions3 with the 
consequence that energy security became a foremost consideration for nation-states 
in the decades that followed to the present day. Over time and with the increasing 
activities of some non-state actors, energy and its security have increased in 
importance as a foreign policy issue in the security agendas of nation-states. Indeed, 
it could be argued that energy security influenced foreign policy decisions and 
relations between nation-states and will continue to frame political, security and 
foreign policy agendas for the remainder of the 21st century.  
 
There are many forms of conventional and unconventional energy including oil, coal, 
electricity, gas, bio fuels solar, wind and nuclear. However, this paper is focused 
mainly on petroleum-based fuel and on gas security and the resilience of those 
energy systems. 
Energy security 
Energy security relates to the ability of an energy user, nation-state or individual to 
have ready and affordable access to an appropriate form of energy as and when 
required. This is a complex issue which has an impact on global, regional, national 
and human security. It is recognised at the outset that energy security means 
different things to different actors. This difference in perception is influenced by a 
number of factors, including the way the separate terms of ‘security’ and ‘energy 
security’ are framed. For example, in international relations the realist view of 
security is a result of power, whereas the idealist school of thought is that security 
can be described as a consequence of peace and cooperation. 
 
The way the term ‘energy security’ is framed depends on factors such as whether a 
nation-state is a net importer or exporter of energy, its geographic location, degree of 
economic stability, whether its claims to energy resources are challenged, and access 
to energy options. The way energy security is interpreted also depends on which 
actor or discipline is framing the concept, and which key biases prevail. For example, 
as explained by Comolli4, in international relations it generally refers to the politics 
of energy and resource management, whereas economists would argue that energy 
supplies are determined by market forces and therefore not a matter of security. A 
perspective which is less likely to be contested is that energy provides the foundation 
for the stability of a nation-state and the wellbeing of its civil society. The way energy 
security is defined and understood in the literature and by different actors varies and 
to a large extent it is context dependent. For example, Sovacool5 defines energy 
security as “equitably providing available, affordable, reliable, efficient, 
environmentally benign, proactively governed, and socially acceptable energy 
                                                
3E. J. Dahl, (2000), ‘From Coal to Oil’, in Joint Force Quarterly, Winter Volume, pp 50-56, p. 50. 
4V. Comolli, (2010), ‘Energy Security’, in B. Giegerich (Ed), Europe and Global Security, Routledge, Oxford, 
pp177-196, p.177. 
5B. K. Sovacool, (2012), Energy security: challenges and needs. WIREs Energy Environ., Vol 1, Issue 1, pp. 51–59. 
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services to end users”. Indeed Sovocool6 provides forty-five definitions of energy 
security with the assumption that the energy security applies primarily to the 
nation-state, while Winzer 7 , on the other hand, provides thirty-five separate 
definitions of security of supply. Definitions also vary regarding where their 
emphasis is placed. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) definition of energy 
security emphasises price and the environment, “the uninterrupted physical 
availability at a price which is affordable, while respecting environmental concerns”8. 
Yergin on the other hand takes a geopolitical perspective and defines it as, “lodged in 
the larger relations among nations and how they interact with one another”.9  
 
For many policy and decision-makers, the term ‘energy security’ is framed in 
economic terms and refers primarily to the ability of nation-states to have 
uninterrupted access to energy at affordable prices without significant and 
unexpected price fluctuations. However, that interpretation is more suitable to net 
importing nation-states rather than net exporters. For producing nation-states, 
energy security can also refer to the absence of risks or threats that might endanger 
or jeopardise the ability to control resources, including extraction, production, 
processing, transportation and storage of energy. This distinction is at the heart of 
the challenges faced by the European Union to achieve a common energy policy that 
is relevant to all twenty-eight member states each of which has its own specific 
polices and agendas. 
 
Brown et al provide the most appropriate definition for this paper as “energy security 
refers to a resilient energy system”10. This definition is further expanded by drawing 
on the UK Energy Research Centre11 working definition for energy system resilience 
as: 
 
Resilience is the capacity of an energy system to tolerate disturbance and to 
continue to deliver affordable energy services to consumers. A resilient energy 
system can speedily recover from shocks and can provide alternative means of 
satisfying energy service needs in the event of changed external 
circumstances. 
 
The availability of energy has an impact on manufacturing, technology, transport, 
commerce, trade and the production of most goods and services. Sufficient fuel and 
infrastructure capacity are necessary to ensure continuity of services; to avoid 
unacceptable levels of interruption to physical supply, and excessive costs to the 
economy from unexpectedly high or volatile prices. In effect, the economic, financial 
and trade systems of each nation-state are underpinned by secure energy and 
resilient sources, production, and supply of energy. From an holistic perspective, an 
insecure energy system would have a negative effect on the general quality of life and 
well-being of civil society – the public health system; food production, processing 
and distribution, transportation; and the environment. Therefore the energy systems 
                                                
6 B. K. Sovacool, (2011), ‘Introduction: Defining, Measuring and Exploring energy Security’, in B. K. Soovacool 
(ed), The Routledge Handbook of energy Security’, Londone & New Yorl, routledge, at pp3-6. 
7Winzer, (2012), ‘Conceptualizing Energy Security’, pp. 42-43. 
8International Energy Agency (2013), Energy Security 2012, International Energy Agency, Paris, paragraph 1. 
9D. Yergin, (2006), ‘Ensuring Energy Security’, in Foreign Affairs, Vol 85, Issue 2, pp. 69-82. 
10M. H. Brown, C. Rewey, T. Gagliano, (2003), Energy Security, National Conference of State Legislatures, 
Washington DC, p.7. 
11M. Chaudry, P. Ekins, K. Ramachandran, A. Shakoor, J.Skea, G. Strbac, X. Wang, J. Whitaker, (2009), Building 
a Resilient UK Energy System, Report UKERC/WP/ES/2009/023, UK Energy Research Centre, London, p.iv. 
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need to be resilient so that, in turn, civil society is resilient and human security is 
enhanced. However, as asserted by Sovocool12, although the energy crises of the 
1970s catalysed global efforts to improve energy security, the opposite is occurring 
and energy security continues to worsen. This view is supported by the ongoing 
tensions and uncertainties associated with the energy situation experienced by a 
number European nation-states which are discussed below. 
Geopolitics of energy 
The transnational nature of energy implicitly presents complex geopolitical 
implications for nation-states. The energy security policies of individual 
nation-states have an impact on relationships with others and on the way 
transnational security infrastructures – such as exploration, pipelines, 
transportation and storage facilities, maritime routes, and processing plants, are 
managed. Energy policies can also affect civil society in unexpected ways, for 
example, freedom of information, because those policies may dictate who can have 
access to information about energy infrastructure and under what circumstances. 
 
The geographical dimensions of energy supply and demand have changed and these 
changes have affected energy security and the role of the energy community as it 
adjusts to changing geopolitical influences. As noted by Bradshaw13, the geopolitics 
of global energy security relate to the influence of geographical factors, such as the 
distribution of centres of supply and demand, on state and non-state actions to 
ensure adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy. Previously, the energy 
sector was defined by US dependence on imported oil, the European Union’s over-
reliance on natural gas imports from Russia, and China’s strategy of seeking equity 
oil in Africa. However, there was a global shift at the beginning of the 21st century 
regarding the location of energy production and demand growth. According to the 
International Energy Agency14, the world’s largest oil producers are Saudi Arabia, 
Russia and the United States. This shift has also seen a growing consumer market for 
energy in Asia and an increasing demand in emerging markets, such as China and 
India. According to Malik15, the rate of energy consumption growth for India will 
increase to 132%; in China and Brazil, demand will grow by 71%, and in Russia by 
21%. These changes present major geopolitical challenges to the energy importing 
economies, particularly those that have limited alternative forms of energy. 
Risks and threats to the energy system 
Risks and threats to the resilience of the energy system can take many forms and can 
occur suddenly. Sources of vulnerability include technical risks such as infrastructure 
failure but actions by nation-states and non-state actors can also threaten supply 
either indirectly, such as in situations of political instability, or directly, for example, 
by sabotage, acts of terrorism, or specific issues motivated activities, such as 
anti-exploration or mining demonstrations and actions. Environmental and climatic 
sources of risk to the security of energy can arise from natural hazards and disasters. 
                                                
12B. K. Sovacool, (2012), Energy security: challenges and needs. WIREs Energy Environ., Vol 1, Issue 1, pp. 51–
59, p.58. 
13M. Bradshaw, ( 2009) ‘The Geopolitics of Energy Security,’ Geography Compass, Vol 3, Issue 5, pp1920–1937 
14International Energy Agency, (2014), 2014 Key World Energy Statistics, International Energy Agency, 11, 14. 
15M. Malik, & Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia). (2008), The geopolitics of energy 
insecurity. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia : Institute of Strategic and International Studies. 
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Other sources of risks, threats and vulnerabilities can be the result of unreliable 
stores of, or access to, energy resources, such as in unstable geopolitical areas. 
Volatility of the geopolitical energy system can have significant and unexpected 
consequences. For example, the major oil production facility in Abqaiq in Saudi 
Arabia was the target of a terrorist attack in 2006. The attack took place at a time of 
continued instability in Iraq, uncertainty regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, and 
ongoing violence and supply disruption in Nigeria. As noted by Al-Rodhan16 , Abqaiq 
is significant for two reasons. First, it contains one of the largest oil fields in the 
world and its facilities are the main oil processing centres for Arabian Extra Light 
and Arabian Light crude oils, with a capacity of more than seven million barrels a 
day. The facilities include pumping stations, gas-oil separator plants, and pipelines. 
Consequently, Abqaiq is pivotal not only for Saudi Arabia’s export capacity, but also 
for global energy production and supply. 
 
Following the 2006 attack on the Abqaiq facility and instability elsewhere, there was 
increasing concern about volatility in world oil prices together with increased risks to 
energy security arising from higher demand, tighter supply, terrorism and political 
instability in energy producing and transit nation-states. The foreign policy stances 
of a number of nation-states were influenced, and possibly constrained, by 
dependence on imported oil from other nation-states. 
 
Several key maritime choke points17 are critical for the global energy transport 
system and, as a consequence, they are potentially vulnerable to disruption. For the 
transport of oil, the most important maritime transit zones are the Strait of Hormuz 
and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Emerson and Stevens18 estimate oil transit 
through the Strait of Hormuz to be between 15.5 million barrels per day (bpd), and 
through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to be between 13.6 million bpd and 15 
million bpd, respectively. The security of maritime choke points ultimately rests on 
the observance of international law, and on the willingness and capacity of interested 
members of the international community to enforce it if necessary. Consequently, 
there is an imperative to maintain the rule of law across the global commons. The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) describes ‘global commons’ as 
resource domains or areas that lie outside of the political reach of any one nation 
state. Thus international law identifies four global commons namely: the High Seas; 
the Atmosphere; Antarctica and Outer Space. These areas have historically been 
guided by the principle of the common heritage of humankind – the open access 
doctrine or the mare liberum (free sea for everyone) in the case of the High Seas. Yet, 
Iran has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz on more than one occasion. In July 
2012 Aljazeera reported Iran state media quoting General Hasan Firouzabadi who 
said, “We do have a plan to close the Strait of Hormuz”19.  
 
The implications and consequences of a vulnerable energy supply system affects civil 
societies in many ways. For example, in addition to the macroeconomic impact of the 
high prices for oil in 2007-08 there were civil demonstrations and protests in France, 
                                                
16K. R. Al-Rodhan, (2006), The Impact of the Abqaiq Attack on Saudi Energy Security, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington DC. 
17Note: Other key maritime chokepoints are the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Bab Al-Mandab, the Suez 
Canal, and the Turkish Straits. 
18C. Emmerson, P. Stevens, (2012), Maritime Choke Points and the global energy System: Charting a Way 
Forward, EERG BP 2012/01, Chatham House, London, p.3. 
19Aljazeera, (2012), ‘Iran Will 'block' Strait of Hormuz if Pressed’, 8 July 2012, Aljazeera Online, at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/2012789645779519.html; accessed 12 July 2012. 
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Spain, Portugal and Italy20. The impact of the price increase went beyond motorists 
and there was a negative impact on the wider transportation sector, agriculture and 
the fishing industries. Protesters blockaded the Channel port of Le Havre and 
hundreds of farmers blocked oil terminals near the cities of Dijon and Toulouse. The 
governments of Spain, Portugal, and Italy were pressed by protesters to provide 
subsidies to the fishing industry to address the gap between high oil prices and low 
fish prices21. Protests also targeted the European Union Fisheries Commission to 
address the high cost of fuel. The global recession in 2008 subsequently saw oil 
prices drop from US$147 to US$32 per barrel over a period of five months from July 
to December22 . 
 
The above examples highlight the vulnerability and fragility of the international 
energy supply sector and demonstrate the impact of energy security issues on foreign 
relations between nation-states and the consequences for civil societies. They also 
underscore the argument that the energy system needs to be resilient, but the 
resilience is impacted by the extent of risk to energy. Security is concerned with risks 
and perception of risk. Similarly, the way energy security is framed and interpreted 
depends on the different forms of risk and threat sources, and their respective impact 
measures. Accordingly, each nation-state must assess its own level of energy security 
against these challenges and thereby determine its own level of energy resilience. As 
demonstrated below, a common energy position across the EU cannot be achieved 
while there is fragmentation of energy security for each member state. 
European Energy and its Security 
The world energy consumption has doubled in the period from 1970 until the 
beginning of the 21st century. According to forecasts, it will increase by more than 
sixty per cent by the year 203023. This increased energy demand will heighten 
pressure on the resilience of the global energy system. The vulnerability of energy 
supplies is highlighted by a review of the energy situation of the European Union 
(EU) where its total import dependence is reported to be 82.6% for oil and 60.3% for 
natural gas, with different levels of dependence for each member nation-state24. The 
fact that a significant number of nation-states depend on their energy supplies to 
transit through other nation-states – including states outside the EU – presents an 
additional risk and is a source of vulnerability not only for the individual nation-state 
but to the overall resilience of the European energy system. 
 
Russia is the EU’s leading supplier of crude oil, accounting for thirty-four per cent of 
EU imports in 2010. In addition, the EU imports significant volumes of refined 
products from Russia, especially diesel oil. Notwithstanding its dependence on gas, 
oil is still the EU’s first source of energy. Conflicting energy demand forecasts add to 
the challenges of planning future European energy security. For example, according 
to the IEA’s25 policy scenario, in line with a global trend of reduction in the share of 
oil in the global energy balance, its share in the EU’s primary energy demand is 
                                                
20Reuters (2008), ‘Fishermen, Police Clash in EU Fuel Protest Source’, in The Epoch Times, 2008. 
21BBC News, (2008), ‘Europe Fuels Protests Spread Wider’, (30 May 2008), at http://bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/europe/7426971.stm  
22R. Tuttle, O. Galal, (2010), Oil Ministers See Demand Rising, Price May Exceed $85, Bloomberg, New York. 
23European Union. Doc. SEC. (2006). 317/2, 3–4. 
24Comolli, (2010), ‘Energy Security’ p.186. 
25IEA, (2011), WEO 2011, New Policies Scenario. 
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anticipated to decrease in coming decades from thirty-five per cent in 2008 to 
twenty-nine per cent in 2035. Potentially, this could lead to a reduction in oil 
consumption in the EU by eleven per cent. However, according to a European 
Commission report, because of declining domestic production, the EU anticipates a 
growing dependence on oil imports, from eighty-two per cent in 2005 to ninety-four 
per cent in 203026. 
 
Europe relies on Russia for most of its gas supply and for a significant amount of oil. 
Most of the oil imported by Belarus from Russia is refined and shipped to European 
nation-states. Belarus ships 400,000 barrels of oil per day westward via Russia’s 
Druzhba pipeline. Germany relies on Belarus for more than a tenth of its oil needs, 
and three-quarters of Poland’s consumption comes from the Belarusian spur of the 
pipeline. Generally, refineries in Belarus hold a week’s worth of oil27 and the energy 
dispute between Russia and Belarus in 2007 had serious implications for recipient 
states in Europe. At the time, the German Economy Minister, Michael Glos28, is 
reported to have stated that the dispute showed that “one sided dependencies must 
not be allowed to develop”. Such concerns remain valid and highlight a significant 
vulnerability not only of the European energy system, but also for nation-states 
outside Europe which depend on imported fuel. 
 
The extent of European reliance on Russia, and the ability of Russia to use its 
position for economic, trade, and political leverage, can be demonstrated in another 
example. At the beginning of 2015 the Russian state energy giant Gazprom cut 
supplies to and through Ukraine amid accusations that its neighbour has been 
siphoning off and stealing Russian gas. Due to these “transit risks for European 
consumers in the territory of Ukraine”, Gazprom cut gas exports to Europe by sixty 
per cent, plunging the continent into an energy crisis ‘within hours’29. Approximately 
forty per cent of Russia’s gas exports to Europe and Turkey travel through Ukraine’s 
Soviet-era network. However, Gazprom reportedly plans to send 63 billion cubic 
meters through a proposed link under the Black Sea to Turkey, fully replacing 
shipments via Ukraine 30 . This proposed diversification strategy may enhance 
Russia’s energy system but it may prove to have long-term detrimental implications 
for the energy security of EU nation-states. 
 
The tension between Ukraine and Russia has been ongoing over a number of years. 
Earlier, in March 2014, Russia threatened to cut off vital natural gas shipments over 
allegedly unpaid bills as part of its dispute over Crimea. In August 2014, the tensions 
between Russia and Ukraine continued and extended to involve other nation-states 
such as the US and the EU. Prior to that, in January 2009 the Russian Gazprom and 
the Ukrainian Naftohaz Ukrainy failed to agree on price levels for that year. The 
subsequent deliberate disruption to the gas supply by Russia affected twelve EU 
member-states and six non-EU nation-states, including those that rely almost 
entirely on gas supplies from Ukraine such as Bulgaria and the Republic of 
                                                
26European Commission, (2013) Roadmap EU-Russian Energy Cooperation until 2050, Brussels, p.17. 
27T. Webb, (2010),’ Dispute Looms as Russia Suspends Belarus Energy Supplies’, in The Guardian online, at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/03/russia-suspends-belarus-energy-supplies 
28A. Rodriguez, (2007), ‘Fuel Spat Worries Europe’, in Chicago Tribune, 9 January 2007.  
29Durden, T., Hedge, Z., (2015), ‘EU Energy Crisis: Russia Cuts Off Gas Supplies through Ukraine To Six 
European Countries’, Centre for Research on Globalization, Montreal at http://www.globalresearch.ca/eu-
energy-crisis-russia-cuts-off-gas-supplies-through-ukraine-to-six-european-countries/5424848 
30Mazneva,E, (2015), ‘Transit to Turkey as EU Cries Foul’, Bloomberg Business, 15 January 2015. 
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Slovakia31. The Eastern European nation-states are the most vulnerable to security of 
supply. This is primarily due to their over dependence on a single supplier and the 
relatively weak integration of their transmission systems with the rest of Europe32. 
Nonetheless there are options that could be investigated to reduce the dependency. 
For example, nation-states in central Europe and Turkey could include a 
combination of LNG supplies and pipeline gas from Azerbaijan. The highly 
dependent nation-states of the Baltic region and south-eastern Europe would also 
benefit further by adopting this approach which would decrease levels of 
vulnerability to supply interruptions and could possibly substantially reduce and 
even eliminate imports33. 
 
The EU imports a significant amount of oil, natural gas, uranium, and coal from 
Russia and while the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue has been established to provide the 
overall structure for energy cooperation between the EU and Russia going forward, 
the vulnerability of EU oil dependent nation-states highlights their reduced 
resilience. The Russian government in its 2030 Energy Strategy announced a 
continuation of its diversification policy for oil exports. The Strategy document notes 
that the share of Russian exports to the Asian countries would grow from six per cent 
to between twenty-two to twenty-five per cent in 203034. Indeed, Russia continues to 
extend its oil export capability through the development of the East Siberia-Pacific 
Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline. In 2012, ESPO transported thirty million tonnes of oil, 
including fifteen million tonnes to China. Fisher35 noted that at the beginning of 
2013 the key recipients of Russian oil from ESPO were Japan (31%), China (24%), 
the USA (22%), together with South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Malaysia. Prior to the completion of the pipeline, Kononczuk 36  forecast that 
diversification of Russian oil to Asian markets would cause an increase in its price on 
the European market. 
 
The above overview of the European energy situation highlights a particular 
vulnerability of the European energy system through over-reliance on external 
suppliers and underscores such dependency as an inhibitor of resilience. 
Enablers and inhibitors of a resilient energy system 
As a result of the volatility of the geopolitical energy system, with particular reference 
to disruptions to the reliability of energy supplies from traditional sources, such as 
the Middle East, nation-states have sought to increase resilience, and therefore the 
security of their energy. An enabler of a resilient energy supply is to build in 
redundancies and to ensure vulnerabilities are minimised. The IEA has set out 
guidelines and requirements for member states as a means to mitigate energy 
vulnerabilities as part of its emergency response mechanisms which were set up 
                                                
31Comolli, (2010), ‘Energy Security’, p.180. 
32Clingendael International Energy Programme, (2014), ‘Russian Gas Imports to Europe and security of supply – 
Fact sheet’, at http://www.clingendaelenergy.com/files.cfm?event=files.download&ui=9C1DEEC1-5254-00CF-
FD03186604989704  
33R. Dickel, E. Hassanzadeh, J. Henderson, A. Honoré, L. El-Katiri, S. Pirani, H. Rogers, J. Stern, K. Yafimava, 
(2014), Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics, 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, OIES Paper NG 92, Oxford. 
34European Commission, (2013), Roadmap EU-Russian Energy Cooperation until 2050, Brussels, p.17. 
35E. Fisher, (2013), ‘Completion of the ESPO Oil Pipeline Connects Siberia to the Pacific Ocean’, in Centre of 
Eastern Studies, p.1. 
36W. Kononczuk, (2008), ‘The East Siberia/Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Oil Pipeline: A Strategic project - An 
Organisational Failure?’, in Centre for Easter Studies Commentary, Issue 12, pp 1- 5, p.3. 
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under the 1974 Agreement on an International Energy Programme. Before becoming 
a member state of the IEA, a candidate state must be a member country of the OECD 
and demonstrate, among other things, that as a net oil importer, it has reserves of 
crude oil and/or product equivalent to a minimum of ninety days of the prior year’s 
average net oil imports. It is a requirement of the IEA regarding access to those oil 
reserves that: 
 
the government (even if it does not own those stocks directly) has immediate access 
should the Co-ordinated Emergency Response Measures (CERM) – which provide a 
rapid and flexible system of response to actual or imminent oil supply disruptions – 
be activated37. 
 
In additional to the IEA emergency response mechanisms, many nation-states have 
sought other sources of supply and forms of energy as a means to achieve greater 
security and, in doing so, to meet obligations to improve energy efficiency and help 
reduce carbon emissions. 
 
Diversification of energy sources can enable a nation-state’s resilience to external 
shocks. Exploration of alternative forms of energy have gained some traction in 
Europe, for example the European Wind Energy Agency38 forecasts that by 2020 
wind power would produce 14-17% of the EU's electricity and this would assist in 
achieving the EU goal of having a twenty per cent share of its gross final energy 
consumption from renewable sources by 202039. 
 
In some instances, the location of new sources of energy has heightened 
vulnerabilities and increased risks due to geopolitical unrest including in transit 
nation-states; or the unproven nature of sources of supply. Similarly, unconventional 
sources of energy can potentially be either an enabler or an inhibitor of energy 
resilience, and can present different security challenges. For example, hydraulic 
fracturing has been identified by some nation-states as an enabler of energy security 
and supply by reducing dependency on imported energy. However other 
nation-states have not adopted hydraulic fracking because of reports of unwanted 
side effects. 
 
The US has developed strategies to reduce its oil dependency including through the 
adoption of the controversial extraction procedures known as ‘fracking’40, but this 
extraction technology has had less take-up in Europe. Banerjee41 reported on an 
internal US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report citing pollution of 
several wells caused by fracking. The EPA report reputedly found that the wells were 
contaminated with methane, and substances such as manganese and arsenic. 
Published research from the University of Texas in 2013 found elevated levels of 
arsenic and heavy metals in ground water near natural gas fracking sites in that 
                                                
37International Energy Agency, (2013), Energy Policy in IEA Countries: Australia 2012, International Energy 
Agency, Paris. 
38European Wind Energy Agency (2014), Statistics and Targets, 
http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/swf/factsheet/1_statisticsandtargets.pdf  
39Eurostat,( 2015), ‘Renewable energy statistics’, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_statistics  
40Note: Hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’, is the process of drilling and injecting fluid into the ground at a high 
pressure in order to fracture shale rocks to release natural gas inside. 
41N. Banerjee, (2013), ‘Internal EPA Report Highlights Dispute over Fracking and Well Water’, in LA Times 
online, 27 July 2013, at latimes,com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-epa-dimock-20130728,0,4847442 
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state’s Barnett Shale. Other concerns have centred on the release of methane gas into 
the atmosphere from fracking sites42. Studies, including those by Fontenot el al43 
contribute to the controversy surrounding hydraulic fracking and unconventional 
energy sources and have in turn influenced political leaders. 
 
Environmental and political concerns have led to moratoriums in several European 
nation-states and the oil-price slump has meant that exploration is a less economic 
proposition and more expensive where the geology has proven complex. France has 
the most potential for unconventional hydrocarbons in mainland Western Europe. 
The shales of the Paris Basin are estimated to have major shale gas and minor shale 
oil potential, while the Jurassic shales in the south-east of the country may also have 
some shale gas potential. But a fracking moratorium has been in place since 2011, 
and was upheld in 2013. Similarly, Germany has not permitted fracking since 2011 
although it does not have significant quantities of prospective shale. The only other 
mainland western European nation-state with significant shale gas potential is the 
Netherlands. However, no fracking for shale gas has been permitted44. Although 
there has been a moratorium on fracking in Denmark since 2012, the government 
has allowed some exploration in Jutland and Zealand. 
 
In Eastern Europe, Bulgaria placed a moratorium on fracking in 2012. While Poland 
has been keen to exploit any potential shale by fracking and consequently to reduce 
its dependence on gas supplied from Russia, hydraulic fracking has yet to prove to be 
economically viable there. The political instability in the Ukraine has determined 
that no fracking will occur in the Donetsk region in the indeterminate future. 
 
The promotion and support for fracking moratoriums and bans means ongoing 
dependence on Russia for energy supply. Yet such bans continue across many EU 
countries with little regard for the resilience of energy supply arising from Russia’s 
past actions of interrupting energy supplies to European nation-states and the 
potential for it to continue such practice in the future. 
 
While there are widespread concerns about fracking, its potential significance and 
the possible implications for European nation-states have been recognised. In one 
example, approximately €12 million has been provided in 2015 to assess the 
environmental impact of the controversial technique and this may assist in 
identifying options to reduce vulnerability and to increase energy resilience by 
investigating the impact of shale gas exploitation and fracking45. However, the 
outcome of the research will not be known for some time and the moratoriums 
remaining in place confirm the dependency on Russia for energy supplies. 
 
There has been some increased implementation of measures to ensure the security of 
gas supply and to achieve a higher degree of preparedness by most European 
                                                
42Note: Methane acts as a greenhouse gas about twenty times as potent as carbon dioxide according to the EPA. 
43B. Fontenot, L.R. Hunt, Z. L. Hildenbrand, D. D. Carlton Jnr, H. Oka, J. L. Walton, D. Hopkins, A. Osorio,  
B. Bjorndal, Q. H. Hu, K. A. Schug, (2013), ’An Evaluation of Water Quality in Private Drinking Water Wells Near 
Natural Gas Extraction Sites in the Barnett Shale Formation’, in Environmental Science and Technology, Vol 47, 
Issue 17, pp 10032-10040. 
44L. Herringshaw, (2015), ‘Whatever happened to the great European fracking boom?’, The Conversation, 11 
march 2015, at http://theconversation.com/whatever-happened-to-the-great-european-fracking-boom-38550  
45E. Kelly, (2015), ‘EU announces around €12 million in funding for fracking research’, Science Business, 25 
February 2015, at http://www.sciencebusiness.net/news/76921/EU-announces-around-%E2%82%AC12-million-
in-funding-for-fracking-research  
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member states. However, the lack of cohesion among European nation-states 
regarding energy security has assisted Russia gain favourable energy terms through 
bilateral arrangements and this strategy has heightened dependence on Russian 
supplies. While energy security has, to some degree, been formalised through Article 
194(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU or ‘Lisbon 
Treaty’)46, there is no legal obligation on the member states. Consequently solidarity 
between them has been absent – or at best, inconsistent. 
 
The EU's 2007 ‘Energy Action Plan’ declared common energy policy has been proven 
to be an inadequate strategy to cope with the new global and geopolitical challenges. 
‘An Energy Policy for Europe’ attempted to bring together all the elements and to 
present a vision for the future of energy in Europe but a number of environmental 
organisations across Europe criticised the Commission for not adopting the 
measures necessary to achieve the stated objectives. Since then, pressure has 
mounted to address the fragmented energy policies across the EU and at the EU 
summit in March, 2015, leaders agreed they wanted to create a single energy market, 
in part to reduce the bloc’s reliance on oil and gas from Russia. The energy union 
envisaged by the heads of state and government from the EU’s twenty-eight 
members would also seek to increase transparency in the gas market, improve energy 
efficiency and help reduce carbon emissions. 
 
While this paper is not focused on forms of renewable energy it is worth noting that 
renewables provided fifteen per cent of the EU’s energy in 2013, according to data 
published by Eurostat47, the EU's official statistical body. The figures show the EU is 
on course to meet its twenty per cent renewables target in 2020, although the UK is 
behind its 2020 renewable energy target. Specifically, transport and heat are lagging 
behind progress in electricity, where wind and solar remain relatively small 
contributors. Notwithstanding such progress, the Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies48 research indicates that it will provide limited scope to reduce significantly 
European overall dependence on Russian gas before the mid-2020s. 
Conclusion 
This paper has set out to establish that while there is an ongoing dependency on 
traditional forms of energy such as petroleum and gas, their respective energy 
systems need to be resilient. Energy security adds to the complexity of foreign policy 
stances of individual nation-state and frames relationships between nation-states 
particularly where there is a dependency on other states for sources of energy and its 
supply. Energy supply security has become a key concern for European nations and 
the European Union, and their energy systems face a number of factors which can 
enhance or inhibit the resilience of those systems. 
 
Energy systems need to be resilient so that, in turn, civil society is resilient and 
human security is enhanced now and in the future. However, to date, European 
energy security policy has been fragmented with the result that it has not been as 
                                                
46 J. Braun, (2011) ‘EU Energy Policy Under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules: Between a New Policy and Business as 
Usual’, EPIN Working Paper No. 31, February 24, 2011. 
47 Eurostat, (2015), ‘Share of energy from renewable sources’, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-
datasets/-/nrg_ind_335a  
48 R. Dickel, et al, (2014), Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: -, Oxford Institute for Energy 
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effective as desired. It has not been successful in achieving robust infrastructure and 
other elements to enhance the security of Europe's energy supply. To a large extent 
this situation has been driven by a lack of solidarity as part of a common foreign 
energy policy. Without effective measures the energy system will be less secure and 
will continue to lack resilience. 
 
A resilient energy system can speedily recover from shocks and can provide 
alternative means of satisfying energy service needs in the event of changed external 
circumstances. It is apparent that in most instances the energy supply system across 
Europe would fail to meet that definition because the energy systems of individual 
European nation-states are uneven and a number of vulnerabilities are evident 
through supply dependencies, due to the adoption of few effective alternative energy 
forms. 
 
As major energy consumers, European nation-states face a number of challenges to 
address future energy needs and to increase the resilience of their energy supply. 
Among these challenges are the ongoing instability in energy producing regions such 
as the Middle East, risks of interruptions to energy supply by Russia, rapidly rising 
global demand and competition for energy resources from emerging economies such 
as China and India, a fragmented internal European energy market, the uncertainty 
of alternative energy options such as fracking, and the imperative to change the 
energy mix to address climate change policy issues. Actively addressing energy 
security in a collaborative way will help to achieve a more resilient energy system for 
the future. 
 
